It is my firm belief that following the thread of June’s post on cognitive schemata will be useful insofar as it helps to outline oral- and written-text production. And that is because there is something left without clear insight: the linguistic elements we can hold in mind at any one time. Again, we’re moving within the range of knowledge and ability, which I’m going to comment on below.
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What has been accepted in late 20th- and early 21st- teaching/learning research is the inability of our brain to sustain short-term memory by pouring into human communication all the bulk of linguistic items we know related to a script - for example, buying. When it comes to performing, the ideal scenario considers “at most seven plus or minus two” conceptual objects (D'Andrade, 1987) that can be simultaneously and rapidly handled. But this may be misleading: a conceptual object is more often than not a package belonging to a cultural schema[1].
For just consider: as soon as we think, say, or write “buying”, the very semantic load of the verb activates brain paths which take for granted other, indispensable conceptual objects. There must be someone (a purchaser) who buys something from someone (else); the latter someone has the object (and is willing to sell it); buying infers transaction through money which, in turn, sends the mind to the (potential) purchaser, seller, merchandise, price, value /worth, interaction between the purchaser and the seller, communication of the offer to buy, the acceptance of sale, the transfer of ownership, plus as varied concepts as bargaining, lending, renting, leasing, gypping, salesmanship, bids, counter-offers, profit making, stores, ads, and a final agreement (see also Fillmore, 1977).
Each and every linguistic element comes with its own
package of semantic and syntactic rules. Without going any further, what
happens when a Spanish speaker wants to express comprarle algo a alguien?
Who is that alguien? – the person who
owns the object or the one for whom you pay to get that particular thing?
People buy something from someone else (i.e.,
the seller) for someone else (i.e., a third party; to
their benefit, for them to enjoy). How easy is it to get it all wrong? For
(much) more information, let me refer you back to blog post 59:
http://challengingmyths.blogspot.com/2012/11/a-bit-of-grammaring.html
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| Norwegian humour: This shop window sells well by Daniel Duma |
Things are by far more complex. At the other end of the spectrum, a native or a competent speaker of English will shake their head in disbelief by saying “I don’t buy that” when they are told something that, for them, is just an absurdity. Why buy? Well, buying and selling is commonplace in the English cultural schema (even more so, presumably, in AmE than in BrE), to such an extent that one can find semantic restructuring like, for instance the book sells well and this shop window sells well. That is why looking up information is indispensable when we customise the mind map that we need for production.
D’Andrade’s (1987) article is as valuable today as it was more than thirty years ago – even more so, given that English is here to stay. What Verspoor’s (1996) schema[2] below suggests is that, all things considered, perception brings on interpretation of what we see, hear and/or sense, whereas knowledge and belief are created within the mind. What still remains problematic (or difficult to define) is the origin and the cause of feelings, emotions, and desires. Nevertheless, intentions and resolutions appear as directly caused only from within.
How would you interpret the arrows drawn between the six concepts above? Could you come up with an example?
What seems to be undeniable is that a mental causation chain is always
in place: a stimulus (mediated by cognition) triggers a mental state. A
previous intention results in action. How does the expression change in each of
the sentences below?
John moved the table. || John made the table move. || John wanted to move the table.
A directly perceived stimulus may be reported as follows:
The table moved. || I saw the table move. || I saw John move the table. || I believed the table to have moved.
The point I’m trying to make is this: whatever idea we want to express will emerge from our mind taking a material form, i.e., a linguistic shape made from words and phrases, all of which will be there – in our discourse – as a function of our knowledge and ability.
[1] By now it is
quite clear that the English and the Spanish cultural schemata are far from
coinciding – perhaps only in what may be called “universals”.
[2]
Reproduced from “The story of -ing: a subjective perspective” In The Construal of Space in Language and
thought. In Pütz & Dirven (eds), pp. 417-454.
